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Abstract
By signing an international river sharing agreement (RSA), countries voluntary commit
to release water in exchange for a compensation. We examine the robustness of such
commitments to reduced water flows. We focus on RSAs that satisfy core lower bounds
and fairness upper bounds. We characterize the constrained upstream incremental RSA as
the core and fair RSA that is sustainable during the most severe droughts. It assigns to
each country its marginal contribution to its followers, up to its maximal benefit from water
extraction. It lexicographically maximizes the welfare of the most upstream countries in
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1 Introduction
It has already been realized that the “global mean net effect of climate since 1750 has been
one of warming” (IPCC 2007:3). The higher world temperatures are expected to increase
the hydrological cycle activity, leading to a general change in precipitation patterns and in-
crease in evapotranspiration. There is also high confidence that many semi-arid areas (e.g.
Mediterranean region, western United States, southern Africa and northeast Brazil) will suf-
fer a decrease in water resources due to climate change (Bates et al. 2008). A recent World
Bank report (Alavian et al. 2009: xvii) summarizes state of the art projections for the 21st
century in precipitation and droughts as follows: Increase (about 2% C) in total precipitations.
High-latitude areas are generally projected to increase, while low-latitude areas are projected
to decrease. Patterns are complex.
The hydrology of river basins is sensitive to changes in climatic conditions. Anthropogenic-
induced climate change is expected to affect water resource cycles significantly. However, the
stochastic nature of the changes in the water cycle is uncertain. As a result, much of the
work by hydrologists, planners, engineers, and economists has globally been brought to the
forefront in an attempt to assess the vulnerability of water supply systems to climate change
and variability (Frederick, Major and Stakhiv 1997; Frederick 2002; Smith and Mendelsohn
2006; Miller and Yates 2005).
The present paper goes one step further by addressing the vulnerability of international
water-sharing agreements to climate change. International basins that are shared by two or
more countries are governed by treaties that allocate water among the riparian countries.
Most treaties signed so far are determined by fixed allocation of the long-term flow based on
historical data. Climate change is likely to modify long-term flow leading to reduced water
supply. However, the magnitude of the future water shortage is uncertain and still debated
among scientists. The resilience of the existing agreements based on past data to reduced
water flows is an issue for the future of water management worldwide. Two global studies
predict that 190/292 (Palmer et al. 2008) and 97/152 (Milly et al. 2005) of the rivers will face
droughts in 2060, suggesting that the majority of the rivers they simulated may face reduction
in water flows. Furthermore, Dinar et al. (2010) recorded complaints made during 1950-2005
regarding water sharing issues by states sharing international rivers. They found that a total
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of 112 complaints have been recorded regarding drought and floods between 1950-2005. One
hundred and six of them regarding droughts and 6 regarding floods.. Several cases exist. We
use the Jordan River to demonstrate the treaty fragility. While the Jordan-Israel water treaty
of 1994 has mechanisms for dealing with shortages that cover a significant range of the possible
shortages, there is no stated mechanism for sharing shortages, mainly in prolonged droughts
and extreme shortages, when they occur. This was the case in the 1998-2000 drought. Israel
stated that it would not be possible to allow Jordan its water allocation according to the
agreement, and it would have to reduce it (Haddadin, 2002). Based on all the above, we focus
our analysis on the water scarcity rather than on a water-abundant projection of change in
future water flows. To address such issues in the paper, we analyze the design of river-sharing
agreements based on mean flows, and their sustainability to unpredicted reduced water flows.
We depart from the river sharing problem introduced by Ambec and Sprumont (2002) and
extended by Ambec and Ehlers (2008). We first study a cooperative game in which countries
negotiate a river sharing agreement (RSA) based on mean flows. It specifies an allocation of
water and transfers among countries. The mean flow can be computed from historical data or
from scientific assessment. In a negotiation among sovereign countries, the agreement should be
accepted in a voluntary manner. In particular, countries are free to refuse any water sharing
agreement at the river basin level if they are better off signing agreements with a partial
number of riparians. To be accepted by all countries, the RSA should make any group of
countries better-off than with any other partial agreement (including no agreement at all). In
other words, it should be in the core of the cooperative game associated with the river sharing
problem.
Many river sharing agreement are in the core. One is the so-called downstream incremental
introduced by Ambec and Sprumont (2002). It assigns to any country its marginal contribution
to the set of predecessors in the river. Doing so, it maximizes lexicographically the welfare of
the most downstream countries in the river in the set of core river sharing agreements. It
thus favors downstream countries against upstream countries. We consider the river sharing
opposite to the downstream incremental: the upstream incremental that assigns to each country
its marginal contribution to its followers in the river. We show that it might not be in the core.
We then posit a slight modification of the upstream incremental RSA by binding upward the
welfare of countries. The welfare of any country is limited to its highest benefit from water
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extraction. That is the welfare it could achieve if it could extract as much water as it wants.
The motivation for this upper bound on welfare is a fairness principle. Since by definition
of water scarcity, it is impossible to assign the highest benefit from water extraction to all
countries, by solidarity, no country should get strictly more than its highest benefit. The so-
called constrained upstream incremental RSA assigns to any country its marginal contribution
to its followers on the river, provided that it is lower than its highest benefit from water
extraction. If not, the country obtains its highest benefit from water consumption, and the
remaining welfare is transferred to the next downstream country in the river. We show that the
constraint upstream incremental distribution is a core RSA. Both the downstream incremental
and the constrained upstream incremental RSA turn out to satisfy two criteria that make them
attractive for riparian countries: the core lower bounds and the fairness upper bounds.
We then examine the vulnerability of core and fair RSAs to defection in case of drought. A
RSA agreement specifies some amount of water to be released in exchange for transfers. With
water flows lower than mean, a country is obliged to consume less than its water allocation
under the RSA in order to fulfill its commitment. Yet the payment it receives from the amount
of water released is unchanged. With water being more valued by countries in case of drought,
a country might be better off by not releasing the amount of water it committed, although
at a cost of not getting the transfer from downstream countries. For a given level of reduced
flow, a RSA is sustainable to some reduced water flows if no country chooses to defect by not
releasing water. Among all core and fair RSAs, the constrained upstream incremental RSA is
the most sustainable one in the sense that it maximizes the range of reduced flows for which
no country defects. By maximizing payment for water released, it avoids defection in case of
drought as much as possible. In contrast, since it assigns the lowest payment for water released,
the downstream incremental RSA is the less sustainable core and fair RSA. It is indeed not
sustainable to drought for the first country in the river.
The economic literature includes several works that focus on various aspects of interna-
tional water sharing issues and their stability in a basin setting. Several studies analyze river
sharing agreements but with deterministic water flows (Ambec and Sprumont, 2002; Ambec
and Ehlers 2008). The impact of different water availability levels on stability of cooperation
is assessed, using different approaches. Beard and McDonald (2007) assess the consistency of
water allocation agreements over time if negotiations are held periodically with known flow
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prior to the negotiation. In a stylized model of two regions, wet and arid, Janmatt and Ruijs
(2007) suggest that storage could enhance water scarcity, if upstream and downstream riparian
countries find a beneficial allocation to sustain it. They find that the collaboration potential is
greater in arid than in wet regions, but that there is little scope for capturing the gains from
basin-level management if economic integration does not extend beyond water issues.
Yet, others introduce the water supply variability into their analysis. Kilgour and Di-
nar (2001) review several sharing rules that are common in international water treaties and
demonstrate how they may not meet the treaty parameters under increased water variability.
Alternative sharing rules are suggested and their sustainability is demonstrated, using the case
of the annual flow of the Ganges River at Farkka, the flash point between India and Bangladesh.
Focussing on interstate river compacts in the United States, Bennett et al. (2000) compare the
efficiency of fixed versus proportional allocation of water with variable water flow. They com-
pute the optimal fixed water allocation taking into account flow variability, whereas, here we
consider fixed water allocation based on mean flow. They do not address the issue of sustain-
ability in case of drought, since the federal government has coercive power to enforce interstate
compacts. Ansink and Ruijs (2008) compare the performance of fixed and proportional agree-
ments regarding their sustainability to reduce water flow. They rely on a two-country repeated
game approach with self-enforcement constraints. Both types of agreements share the same
division of welfare which translates into a payment from the downstream country to the up-
stream country. The authors show that fixed agreements are less sustainable than proportional
agreements. Our paper departs from the last study in two features. First, we do not compare
the performance of different types of agreements with similar exogenous surplus sharing rules
(i.e. transfers) among countries. We rather focus on fixed agreement but endogenize the sur-
plus sharing rule. We want to identify the surplus sharing rule (or equivalently the transfers
among countries) that is more sustainable to drought. Our paper is thus more on the design
of fixed water sharing agreements than on the comparison of different types of agreements. It
aims to recommend transfers that are less vulnerable to defection in case of drought. Second,
we do not restrict our analysis to bipartite agreements. We consider a river shared by n ≥ 2
countries. Doing so, we allow for partial agreements in the river basin and coalition deviations
during the negotiation. We also highlight the importance of the spatial structure in a river
sharing problem. As suggested by Dinar (2008), geography is an important aspect that explains
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many of the outcomes of treaty stability as affected by water supply variability. We address
the geography aspect in the design of the RSA.
The paper proceeds as follow. We introduce the model in Section 2. We analyze the design
of river sharing agreements in Section 3. In particular, we define the constrained upstream
incremental river sharing agreement. We show that it is in the core and it is fair. In Section 4,
we study the vulnerability of river sharing agreements to defection in case of drought. We show
that the constrained upstream incremental river sharing agreement is the more sustainable river
sharing agreement among those that are fair and in the core. We conclude the paper with an
illustrative example.
2 The river sharing problem
A set N = {1, ..., n} of countries are located along a river and share its water. We identify
countries by their locations along the river and number them from upstream to downstream:
i < j means that i is upstream to j. A coalition of countries is a non-empty subset of N . Given
two coalitions S and T , we write S < T if i < j for all i ∈ S and all j ∈ T . Given a coalition
S, we denote by minS ≡ mini S and maxS ≡ maxi S, respectively, the smallest and largest
members of S, i.e. S = {minS, ...,maxS}. Let Pi = {1, . . . , i} denote the set of predecessors
of country i and P 0i = Pi\{i} denote the set of strict predecessors of country i. Similarly, let
Fi = {i, i+ 1, . . . , n} denote the set of followers of country i and let F 0i = Fi\{i} denote the
set of strict followers of i. A coalition S is connected if for all i, j ∈ S and all k ∈ N , i < k < j
implies k ∈ S. For any n-dimension vector y = (yi)i∈N , we denote by yS = (yi)i∈S the vector
of its components in S for any arbitrary S ⊂ N .
Each country i ∈ N enjoys a benefit bi(xi) from diverting xi units of water from the river.
We assume that the benefit function bi is differentiable for all xi > 0 and strictly concave.
Furthermore, b′i(xi) goes to infinity as xi approaches 0 and there exists a satiation point xˆi > 0
such that b′i(xˆi) = 0. In other words, xˆi is country i’s optimal water diversion and if it diverts
more than xˆi, then it incurs a marginal loss (compared to diverting xˆi) from over-diversion.
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1The interpretation of a loss in the case of over diversion can be explained as damages of floods, which is the
other extreme of the distribution of the annual flow. The hydrologic explanation to such damages is that the
infrastructure in country i is fixed in the short run and cannot accommodate the extra amount of water.
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Each country i ∈ N controls a flow of water ei ≥ 0 with e1 > 0 at the river source. It
includes water supplied by tributaries or stored in a reservoir controlled by i. Moreover, it also
includes the water flow that is not needed by upstream countries. More precisely, if the natural
flows of water along the river at e′ ≡ (e′1, ..., e′n) is such
∑
j∈Pi xˆj <
∑
j∈Pi e
′
j for at least one i
then we define the vector of controlled water flow as e = (e1, ..., en) by proceeding as follows.
Let k be the more upstream agent in N such that
∑
j∈Pk xˆj <
∑
j∈Pk e
′
j . The flow of water
controlled by k is ek = xˆk and the remaining flow e
′
k − xˆk is transferred to k + 1. The flow of
water controlled by k + 1 is ek+1 = min{xˆk+1, e′k+1 + e′k − xˆk}. If xˆk+1 < e′k+1 + e′k − xˆk then
ek+1 = xˆk+1 and the remaining water e
′
k+1 + e
′
k − xˆk − xˆk+1 is transferred to k + 2 and so on
until reaching country n. It implies that the controlled water flows e are such that ei ≤ xˆi for
every i ∈ N .2
A feasible allocation of water is a vector x = (x1, ..., xn), which satisfies the following
resource constraints at any location i along the river for every i ∈ N :∑
j∈Pi
xj ≤
∑
j∈Pi
ej . (1)
Countries might perform unbounded transfers among themselves. A river sharing agreement
(RSA) based on controlled water flows e = (e1, ..., en) is a tuple (x, t) where x = (x1, ..., xn) is a
feasible allocation of water and t = (t1, ..., tn) is a vector of transfers that satisfies the following
budget-balance constraint:∑
i∈N
ti = 0.
Without any cooperative agreement among countries, each country diverts as much water
as possible up to the satiation point. More precisely, the free-access exploitation of water in the
river defines a non-cooperative game in which countries sequentially decide how much to extract
given the available flow in the river. The sequence of extraction is defined by the localization on
the river starting from country 1 to country n. At the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the
sequential water extraction game, each country i chooses the level of extraction that maximizes
its own benefit bi, given the amount of water extracted upstream to it. Since the controlled flow
2While our paper focuses on one main, through border, geography, there is another important, border creator,
geography, that may lead to different results. This is left for future research. For insight see Dinar S. (2008)
and Kilgour and Dinar (2001).
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is by definition lower than the satiated level ei ≤ xˆi for every i ∈ N , each country i extracts
ei at the subgame Nash equilibrium of the free-access extraction game. Hence the free-access
water allocation is simply the controlled water flow e. For instance, in the particular case of
water supplied only in the river source (no tributaries), the water flow
∑k
j=1 ej is extracted in
turn by several countries. Each country i < k extracts its controlled share xˆi = ei, country k
extracts what is left ek ≤ xˆk leaving nothing to downstream countries j > k.
As long as water is scarce at some location i (or for country i) in the sense that
∑
j∈Pi xˆj <∑
j∈Pi ej , i.e., there is not enough water to satisfy the demand of all countries upstream of i
(including i), the free-access allocation of water is inefficient. Given the concavity of the benefit
function and since some downstream agents get less than their optimal diversion xˆi, the total
welfare, defined as the sum of benefits of the basin countries, can be increased if upstream
countries divert less water to supply downstream agents.3 They would agree to refrain from
diverting water if they are compensated by downstream agents in some ways, e.g. through
side payments. This is the idea of a water sharing agreement, in which the upstream countries
agree to let more water flow in the river in exchange of some monetary from the downstream
countries.4
In what follow we examine two aspects of river sharing agreements, namely their design
based on controlled water flows e and their sustainability to reduced water flows e′ ≤ e, where
the sign “ ≤ ” means e′j ≤ e′j for every j ∈ N and e′i < ei for one i ∈ N at least. This
change of mean flow is somehow “unexpected” in the sense that each country or group of
countries considers its own welfare under mean flow as an objective function. We analyze the
river sharing agreement, which is designed in a deterministic world in which the realized flow
is mean flow before moving to its sustainability to water flow lower than mean flow.
3In practice, the above welfare improvement is potentially high, since under most known cases of cross border
basins marginal value product of water in the downstream country is higher than in the upstream country. For
example in the case of South Africa and Lesotho on the Orange River.
4An actual case is the Bishkent agreement on the Syr Darya River between Tajikistan (upstream) and
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan (downstream), where some winter water, usually used by the upstream country for
creation of electricity is stored, and released only in the summer for irrigation by the downstream countries.
That exchange has an agreed monetary value expressed in terms of non-renewable energy resources of gas and
oil (Dinar et al. 2007).
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3 The design of water sharing agreements
We first consider the design of a water sharing agreement (RSA) based on water flows e among
countries, assuming that any country or group of countries is free to sign it or not. In particular,
a group of countries would reject a basin-wide RSA, if it can be better off by signing its own
RSA. We need to define the welfare that a coalition of countries can achieve by itself with its
own sub-basin RSA. It depends on the behavior of the countries outside the coalition. For
instance, a coalition can “free-ride” on outsiders’ cooperation if a country upstream from the
coalition agrees to release more water to supply its downstream partners. The cooperative game
associated with the river sharing problem is a cooperative game with externalities. Following
Ambec and Ehlers (2008), we assume that the members of a coalition expect the outsiders to
play non-cooperatively when they compute their highest welfare (they do not coordinate their
water extraction). More precisely, they expect that the outsiders will extract up to be satiated
which is the worse that can credibly happen to coalition S as shown in Ambec and Ehlers
(2008). Denoted by v(S, e), this welfare is the highest that coalition S can secure by signing
its own RSA with water flows e.5
Consider a coalition S ⊂ N . Since countries upstream to coalition S behave non-cooperatively
by extracting water under free-access, each country i diverts its controlled water flow ei. Hence,
the most upstream country in S labeled as minS has access to eminS units of water. This first
observation allows us to define the secured welfare of any connected coalition S ⊂ N :6
v(S, e) = maxxS
∑
i∈S bi(xi),
subject to∑
j∈Pi∩S xj ≤
∑
j∈Pi∩S ej
for every i ∈ S.
For a disconnected coalition S, we need to decompose S into its connected components. Let
C(S) = {Tk}Kk=1 denote the set of connected components of S, i.e. C(S) is the coarsest partition
of S such that Tk ∈ C(S) is connected for k = 1, ...,K with Tk < Tk+1 for k = 1, ...,K − 1.
Members of coalition S expect that if they release some water downstream to a connected
5Note that v(S, e) can be viewed as the payoff to coalition S in the subgame perfect equilibrium of an non-
cooperative extraction game played by the coalitions in the partition {S, {i}i∈N\S} (see Ambec and Ehlers, 2008,
for a more general analysis).
6Recall that S is connected if for any i, j ∈ S and all k ∈ N , i < k < j implies k ∈ S.
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component Tk ∈ C(S) to supply the next connected component Tk+1 ∈ C(S), countries located
in-between Tk and Tk+1 would divert water up to their satiated level. Formally, for any water
allocation xS within S, each country l ∈ N\S outside S diverts:7
xncSl ≡ min{xˆl,
∑
j∈Pl
ej −
∑
i∈Pl∩S
xl −
∑
k∈Pl\S
xncSk }. (2)
Therefore the highest welfare that any coalition of countries S ⊂ N can secure by signing its
own RSA is:
v(S, e) = maxxS
∑
i∈S bi(xi),
subject to∑
j∈Pi∩S xj ≤
∑
j∈Pi∩S ej −
∑
k∈Pi∩S xk −
∑
l∈Pi\S x
ncS
l ,
for every i ∈ S.
(3)
where xncSl is defined by (2) for every j ∈ N\S. The solution of (3) that we denote xSS is the
efficient allocation of water among members of S, given that the countries outside S divert
water up to their satiated level. Its computation follows a backward induction mechanism
described in Ambec and Ehlers (2008). It is uniquely defined. It yields to coalition S a secured
welfare of
v(S, e) =
∑
i∈S
bi(x
S
i ).
An important property of the secured welfare v that will be useful later is its superadditivity:
for any S, T ∈ N , since the water allocation (xTT , xSS) can be implemented in T ∪S, v(T ∪S, e) ≥
v(T, e) + v(S, e) for any eN .
The secure welfare v(N, e) of the “grand” coalition N is the highest total welfare that can
be achieved at the basin level. The solution x∗ of (3) for the grand coalition S = N is the
efficient allocation of the controlled flows e. It is unique and described in Ambec and Sprumont
(2002) (see also Kilgour and Dinar 2001) as follows. There exists a partition {Nk}k=1,...,K of
N and a list (βk)
K
k=1 of non-negative numbers such that:
Nk < Nk′ and βk > βk′ whenever k < k
′
b′i(x
∗
i ) = βk for every i ∈ Nk and every k = 1, . . . ,K
7The definition of xncSl applies for all l countries outside S: those upstream S, in-between two connected
component of S and downstream S.
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x∗i ≤ xˆi for all i ∈ N∑
i∈Nk
(x∗i − ei) = 0 for every k = 1, . . . ,K − 1.
In other words, the efficient allocation of water equalizes marginal benefits whenever possible.
If not, it bounds the feasibility constraints, which defines the subsets in which marginal benefits
are equals. The marginal benefit is the shadow value of water at that river location, which
reflects its scarcity. Marginal benefit is decreasing when moving from one subset downstream
to the next one because water is less scarce when the river is supplied by tributaries along its
stream. Marginal benefits are indeed equals in rivers without tributaries or in canals supplied
by a reservoir in country 1 because the same amount of water is available for all countries in
the river. In this particular case, N1 = N . Yet a tributary might supply say country i with
water. Therefore, more water is available for country i and all countries j > i downstream i.
Then it might be that the feasibility constraint is binding in i. Therefore the shadow value of
water and the marginal benefit of countries is higher upstream of i than downstream of i.
A coalition S of countries is better off with the basin-wide RSA (x, t) than under a partial
agreement among members of S if its welfare
∑
i∈S(bi(xi) + ti) is at least what it could secure
by its own v(S, e). Therefore, in order to be accepted by sovereign countries, a basin-wide RSA
should satisfy the following core lower bounds.8
Definition 1 A RSA (x, t) associated with the river sharing problem (N, b, e) is a core RSA
if and only if it satisfies the following core lower bounds for every S ⊂ N :∑
i∈S
(bi(xi) + ti) ≥ v(S, e). (4)
The core lower bound for the “grand coalition” N at the basin level implies that the water
allocation in a core RSA must be efficient. Thus the core lower bound for S = N uniquely
defines the allocation of water x = x∗. By contrast, several transfer schemes are in the core,
in the sense that they satisfy the core lower bounds with the efficient allocation of water x∗.
A transfer scheme defines a distribution z of the total welfare v(N, e) =
∑
i∈N bi(x
∗
i ) with
8The terminology borrowed from Ambec and Ehlers distinguishes between two core lower bounds: the coop-
erative and non-cooperative ones, depending if players outside S play cooperatively or non-cooperatively. Our
core lower bounds correspond to their non-cooperative core lower bounds. The core lower bounds define the
core of the cooperative game associated with the river sharing problem.
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zi = bi(x
∗
i )+ ti for i =, ..., N . Ambec and Ehlers (2008) show that the downstream incremental
distribution defined by zdi ≡ v(Pi, e)− v(P 0i, e) for every i ∈ N satisfies all core lower bounds.
It assigns to each country its marginal contribution to the set of predecessors. The welfare
distribution zd defines the downstream incremental transfer scheme tdi ≡ v(Pi, e)− v(P 0i, e)−
bi(x
∗
i ) for i = 1, ..., n. The downstream incremental RSA (x
∗, td) is therefore in the core of the
cooperative game associated with any given river sharing problem (N, b, e).
The downstream incremental RSA obviously favors downstream countries. Indeed the most
downstream country n gets its marginal contribution to the total welfare zdn = b(x
∗
n) + t
d
n =
v(N, e) − v(N\{n}, e), the second one n − 1 obtains its marginal contribution to remaining
welfare v(N\{n}, e) to be shared, that is b2(x∗2)+ td2 = v(N\{n}, e)−v(N\{n, n−1}, e), and so
forth up to the first country which gets its stand-alone welfare v({1}, e). Among the RSAs that
belong to the core, the downstream incremental RSA lexicographically maximizes the welfare
of n, n− 1, ..., 1.
The RSA opposite of the downstream incremental in the set of core RSAs is the upstream
incremental RSA. It assigns to any country i its marginal contribution to the set Fi of followers
in the river. Denoted by (x∗, tu), it divided the total welfare v(N, e) by assigning zui = b(x
∗
i ) +
tui ≡ v(Fi, e)− v(F 0i, e) to agent i for i = 1, ..., n. It defines the upstream incremental transfer
scheme tu with tui ≡ v(Fi, e) − v(F 0i, e) − bi(x∗i ) for i = 1, ..., n. It favors upstream countries
over downstream countries by lexicographically maximizing the welfare of countries 1, 2, ...,
n. The first country 1 obtains its marginal contribution to the welfare zu1 = b1(x
∗
1) + t
u
1 =
v(N, e)− v(N\{1}, e), the second one n− 1 obtains its marginal contribution to the remaining
welfare v(N\{1}, e) to be shared, that is zu2 = b2(x∗2) + tu2 = v(N\{n}, e)− v(N\{1, 2}, e), and
so forth up to the last country which enjoys its stand alone welfare v({n}, e). Hereafter, we
often omit set brackets for sets and write i instead of {i} or v(i, j, e) instead of v({i, j}, e).
Although the upstream and downstream RSAs are constructed in a symmetric way, sur-
prisingly, the upstream incremental RSA fails to satisfy the core lower bounds for rivers shared
by more than two countries.9
Proposition 1 The upstream incremental RSA fails to satisfy the core lower bounds for n > 2.
9It is easy to show that upstream incremental RSA satisfies the core lower bounds for n = 2. Indeed, it
assigns zu1 = v(1, 2, e)−v(2, e) ≥ v(1, e) by subadditivity of v and , zu2 = v(2, e), which imply zu1 +zu2 = v(1, 2, e).
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The above result points out the importance of satiated water consumption in the benefit func-
tions. Indeed with always increasing and concave benefits, i.e. with xˆi = +∞ for every i ∈ N ,
Ambec and Sprumont (2000) have shown that the cooperative game associated with the river
sharing problem is convex. It implies that the upstream incremental distribution zu satisfies all
core lower bounds. Proposition 1 shows that it is not true with more general concave benefit
functions with finite satiated water consumption.
To identify a RSA in the core that favors lexicographically the most upstream countries,
we introduce an additional requirement. We impose that no country should enjoy a welfare
higher than its satiated benefit bi(xˆi). This requirement is inspired by a fairness principle
introduced by Moulin (1990) for games with externalities. Since water is scarce in the sense
that not all countries can consume their satiated level and, therefore, enjoy its satiated benefit,
by solidarity, no country should get strictly more than its satiated level. A country i that
enjoys a strictly higher welfare than bi(xˆi) is able to extract more welfare with scarce water at
the expense of the other countries. This principle defines upper bounds on countries’ individual
welfare.10
Definition 2 A RSA (x, t) of the river sharing problem (N, b, e) is a fair RSA if and only if
it satisfies the satiated benefit upper bounds:
bi(xi) + ti ≤ bi(xˆi) for all i ∈ N. (5)
We restrict our attention to core and fair RSAs. Ambec and Ehlers (2008) show that the
downstream incremental RSA satisfies upper bounds more stringent than the satiated benefit,
namely the aspiration welfare upper bounds. It is therefore fair in addition to being a core
RSA. It is the RSA that maximizes lexicographically the welfare of country n, n − 1 ,..., 1
in the set of fair and core RSAs. The RSA opposite of the downstream incremental RSA in
the set of fair and core RSAs is the constrained upstream incremental RSA. It is the core and
fair RSA that lexicographically maximizes the welfare of country 1, 2,..., n. Denoted with the
superscript “cu”, the constrained upstream incremental RSA (x∗, tcu) assigns to country 1 a
welfare zcu1 = b1(x
∗
1) + t
cu
1 ≡ min{v(F1, e)− v(F 01, e), b1(xˆ1)}. If v(F1, e)− v(F 01, e) > b1(xˆ1),
10With similar concave and single peak benefit functions but with equal access to water, Ambec (2008) has
shown that the Walrasian allocation with equal division of water might assigns to some agents more than their
satiated benefits. It therefore violated the below fairness upper bounds.
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i.e. country 1’s marginal contribution to its followers is strictly higher than its satiated benefit,
the remaining welfare r(1) ≡ min{zcu1 − b1(xˆ1), 0} is assigned to the next country in the river.
Country 2 obtains zcu2 = b2(x
∗
2) + t
cu
2 ≡ min{v(F2, e) − v(F 02, e) + r(1), b2(xˆ2)}. And so
on and so forth for the next downstream countries. More generally, the constrained upstream
incremental distribution assigns zcui = bi(x
∗
i )+t
cu
i ≡ min{v(Fi, e)−v(F 0i, e)+r(i−1), bi(xˆi)} to
each country i ∈ N where r(i−1) ≡ min{zcui−1−bi−1(xˆi−1), 0} for every i ∈ N\{1} and r(0) = 0.
The constrained upstream incremental transfer scheme tcu is thus defined by tcui = z
cu
i − bi(x∗i )
for i = 1, ..., n. It satisfies the satiated benefit upper bounds by construction. The next
proposition establishes that it is a core RSA.
Proposition 2 The constrained upstream incremental RSA (x∗, tcu) satisfies the core lower
bounds.
We now turns to the sustainability of RSAs to reduced water flows.
4 The sustainability of water sharing agreements
We examine compliance with an RSA under reduced water flows e′ ≤ e. By signing an RSA
(x∗, t), a country commits to release water against money. More precisely, country 1 commits
to release e1 − x∗1 to supply downstream countries in exchange for a transfer t1. Country 2
receives e1 − x∗1 units of water in exchange for t1. It commits to release e1 + e2 − x∗1 − x∗2
units of water downstream in exchange for t2 + t1. More generally, each country i > 1 receives∑
j∈P 0i(ej − x∗j ) units of water from upstream countries in exchange of a payment
∑
j∈P 0i tj .
Each country i < n agreed to release
∑
j∈Pi(ej − x∗j ) units of water to supply downstream
countries in exchange for
∑
j∈Pi tj .
The RSA (x∗, t) commits countries to release water independently of the realized water
flows. When the realized water flows are mean flows e′i = ei, then country i enjoys a welfare
bi(x
∗
i ) + ti by fulfilling its duties providing that everyone else do the same. However, if the
realized water flow e′ is lower than the mean for country i < n, i.e. e′i < ei, then i is forced
to consume less than its allocation xi to fulfill its commitment. More precisely, from the water
flow it controls e′i +
∑
j∈P 0i(ej − x∗j ), country i must release
∑
j∈Pi(ej − x∗j ) which limits its
consumption to e′i−ei+x∗i < x∗i . It therefore enjoys a welfare of bi(e′i−ei+x∗i )+ti < bi(x∗i )+ti.
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It might be tempted not to release the water it had committed to, but at a cost of renouncing
to be paid by downstream countries. Doing so, it can consume e′i +
∑
j∈P 0i(ej − x∗j ) units of
water. It thus achieves a welfare of bi(min{e′i +
∑
j∈P 0i(ej − x∗j ), xˆi}). 11 For a given RSA
(x∗, t), let us denote country i’s water consumption under the realized water flow e′i at i by
x′i ≡ e′i − ei + x∗i (6)
and the water flow controlled by country i by
E′i ≡ min{e′i +
∑
j∈P 0i
(ej − x∗j ), xˆi} (7)
for every i ∈ N . We assume x′i ≥ 0: the realized flow of water allows any country i to fulfill its
duties.12
Definition 3 An RSA (x∗, t) is sustainable under realized water flow e′ ≤ e if it satisfies the
following no-defection constraints for every i ∈ N :
bi(x
′
i) + ti ≥ bi(E′i)−
∑
j∈P 0i
tj .
The no-defection constraints insures that all countries release what they committed to. They
obviously hold when the realized water flow is the mean flow e′ = e for any core RSA. Further-
more, the no-defection constraint for the most downstream country n always holds because it
does not have to release water.13 Symmetrically, since the most upstream country in the river
does not receive any water from upstream countries, E′1 = e′1 and
∑
j∈P 01 tj = 0. Thus the
sustainability constraint for country 1 simplifies to b1(x
′
1)+t1 ≥ b1(e′1). In the next proposition,
we show that it is violated under the downstream incremental RSA (x∗, td) as long as water
flow controlled by 1 is reduced.
Proposition 3 The downstream incremental RSA is not sustainable for any reduced flow e′1 <
e1.
11We assume that countries release water only when they are paid: a country cannot receive the water released
without paying upstream countries.
12Otherwise defection is not a choice but an obligation.
13The budget balance constraint implies that tn = −∑j∈P0n tj combined to E′n = x′n, leads to the same value
both sides of the inequality in Definition 3.
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The downstream incremental RSA is not sustainable to a drought of water controlled by
country 1. Under mean flow e1, country 1 obtains its stand-alone welfare b1(e1) by releasing
water and consuming x∗1. More precisely, it receives a compensation b1(e1)−b1(x∗1) in exchange
of e1 − x∗1 units of water. Under reduced flow e′1 < e1, the RSA allows country 1 to consume
x′1 = e′1 − (e1 − x∗) < x∗1 in exchange for the same transfer b1(e1) − b1(x∗1). If it defects, it
obtains its reduced stand-alone welfare b1(e
′
1). However, since the marginal benefit from water
consumption is decreasing (b1 is concave), its marginal loss from water released b1(e
′
1)− b1(x′1)
is higher than the compensation it receives b1(e1) − b1(x∗1). Having higher-value water with
reduced flow, country 1 prefers to keep it rather than to release what it is committed to in
exchange for the same transfer of compensation.
We are able now to establish our main result.
Theorem 1 The constrained upstream (resp. downstream) incremental RSA is the most (resp.
less) sustainable RSA in the sense that it is (resp. is not) sustainable to more severe droughts
than any other core and fair RSA.
By maximizing lexicographically the welfare of the most upstream countries, the constrained
upstream incremental RSA assigns the highest compensations for water released to country
1, 2,..., n. It thus sets the “price”
∑
j∈Pi tj paid by a country i + 1 to country i for the∑
j∈Pi(ej − x∗j ) units of water released from upstream at the highest possible level. Doing
so it minimizes the incentive for i to defect by not releasing water, making defection not
profitable for some levels of droughts. On the other hand, by maximizing lexicographically the
welfare of the most downstream countries, the downstream incremental RSA assigns the lowest
compensations to country 1, 2,...,n. Doing so it minimizes the price paid for the same volume
of water released
∑
j∈Pi(ej − x∗j ). In particular, the price td1 paid for e1 − x∗1 released by 1 to
2 is so low that country 1 prefers to defect as long as water flow is lower than the mean. The
following example shows that with a compensation tcu1 , country 1 still transfers e1−x∗1 for some
levels of reduced flow. That is, the constrained upstream incremental RSA is sustainable to
some drought at the source while the downstream incremental RSA is not.
Example 1 Let assume n = 2, b1 = b2 = b, e2 < e1 < xˆ1 = xˆ2 and, therefore, x
∗
1 =
x∗2 =
e1 + e2
2 and the total welfare to be shared is v(N, e) = v(1, 2, e) = 2b(
e1 + e2
2 ). Under
the constraint upstream incremental RSA with mean flow, country 1 obtains b1(x
∗
1) + t
cu
1 =
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v(1, 2, e)−v(2, e) = 2b(e1 + e22 )− b(e2). Country 1’s welfare under (x∗, tcu) with reduced water
flow e′1 < e1 is thus b(x′1) + tcu1 = b(e′1− ) + b(x∗2)− b(e2) with  = e1−x∗1. On the other hand,
by not releasing water, country 1 obtains b(e′i). The no-defection constraint holds for country
1 if b(e′1 − ) + b(x∗2) − b(e2) ≥ b(e′1), which, since x∗2 = e2 + e1 − x∗1 = e2 +  by the binding
feasibility constraint (1), can be rewritten as
b(e2 + )− b(e2) ≥ b(e′1)− b(e′1 − ). (8)
By concavity of b and e′1 ≥  > 0, a sufficient condition for (8) to hold is e2 ≤ e′1 − , that is
e1 + e2
2 ≤ e′1. Since
e1 + e2
2 < e1 by assumption, there exists a range of reduced water flows
such that country 1 does not defect under (x∗, tcu). For instance, if e2 = 0, country 1 does not
defect for any reduced control flow e′1 ∈ [e12 , e1]. On the other hand, as shown in Proposition 3,
country 1 defects under the downstream incremental RSA (x∗, td) for any reduced flow e′1 < e1.
Theorem 1 sets lower bounds of reduced flow e′i for which there exist a core RSA which
is sustainable. Let us denote by e′i the lowest water flow for which the constrained upstream
incremental RSA is sustainable for every i < n. It is uniquely defined by the binding no-
defection constraint:
bi(E
′
i)− bi(e′i) =
∑
j∈P 0i
tcuj =
∑
j∈F 0i
bj(x
∗
j )− v(F 0i, e).
where E′i ≡ min{ei + x∗ − ei, xˆi}.
Corollary 1 A vector of reduced flows e′ ≤ e can be sustained under an RSA based on mean
flow e if and only if ei ≥ ei for every i > n.
We conclude the sustainability section with a last appealing property of the constrained up-
stream incremental RSA regarding efficiency. The defection of one country is efficient if the
total welfare after defection can be higher than before defection. We show that the constrained
upstream incremental RSA avoid inefficient defection in case of drought in one country only.
Consider a drought e′ ≤ e such that e′i < ei for one i < n and e′j = ej for every j ∈ N . Under
realized water flow e′, country i controls less water than mean, whereas all other countries con-
trol mean flows. In the case of a river supplied only by the source located in country 1, country
i is the last country to obtain some water under non-cooperative extraction. It experiences a
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reduction of the flow it controls in case of drought at the source.14 In the case of a river with
tributaries, the drought concerns only the tributary located in country i’s territory. Suppose
that country i defects, then bi(x
′
i) + t
cu
i < bi(E
′
i)−
∑
j∈P 0i t
cu
j , which can be rewritten as
bi(x
′
i) < bi(E
′
i)−
∑
j∈Pi
tcuj .
By definition of tcu,
∑
j∈Pi(bj(x
∗
j ) + t
cu
j ) = v(N, e) − v(F 0i, e) which, substituted in the last
inequality, yields:
bi(x
′
i) < bi(E
′
i)− v(N, e) + v(F 0i, e) +
∑
j∈Pi
bj(x
∗
j ).
Since v(N, e) =
∑
j∈N bj(x
∗
j ), it simplifies to
bi(x
′
i) +
∑
j∈N\i
bj(x
∗
j ) <
∑
j∈P 0i
bj(x
∗
j ) + bi(E
′
i) + v(F
0i, e). (9)
The left side in (9) is the total welfare of river sharing with reduced water flow e′ < e if the
RSA is still in order, while the right side in (9) is the highest total welfare if i defects by note
releasing water and, therefore, countries downstream to i are on their own: they achieve at
most v(F 0i, e). We therefore have established the following result.
Proposition 4 Consider a drought at i only, i.e. e′ ≤ e such that e′i < ei and e′j = ej for
every j 6= i. Then (x∗, tcu) is sustainable only if defection is inefficient in the sense that it
reduces total welfare.
5 Conclusion
Scientists agree that global warming is likely to reduce water flow. Yet they disagree on the
magnitude of the future water shortage. This ambiguity is not embedded in international
river sharing arrangements. Most international treaties assign average water flow based on
historical data to countries that have poor predictive power under climate change. Even if
the forecasted average water flow is corrected by the prospected climate change, the ambiguity
14Recall that with no tributaries, all countries upstream j < i control their satiated level ej = xˆj whereas
i controls what is left ei and all countries downstream control no water flow. We consider a drought e
′ ≤ e
that allows countries upstream i to control their satiated consumption level ej = e
′
j = xˆj for j < i whereas i
experiences reduced control flow e′i < ei. All countries downstream i still control no flow.
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of its magnitude makes this prediction difficult to assess. It also increases the probability of
predicted average flow to be false.
By signing international river sharing treaties voluntarily, countries have a self-interest in
complying with them, as long as the average water flow is as expected. Even if an agreement
specifies water supply to downstream countries, a country is better off by releasing what it had
committed to, since the payment it receives from downstream countries offsets its welfare loss
from releasing water. This is not always the case under water drought within its territory. To
release the same amount of water, the country is obliged to consume less water than average.
It prefers to defect if the payment does not compensate its welfare loss from releasing water.
In this paper, we analyze the above defection strategy by countries. We characterize the
river sharing agreement that is robust to defection for the most severe droughts. The so-
called constrained upstream incremental river sharing agreement maximizes lexicographically
the welfare of the most upstream countries in the set of acceptable river sharing agreements
(in the sense of being fair and in the core). It is opposite to the downstream incremental river
sharing agreement that have been put forward by the literature on the river sharing problem.
An example computed in Appendix E shows that the two agreements might not coincide. It
also illustrates how the design of a river sharing agreement impacts its sustainability to water
shortage. Since drought events are likely to be more frequent in the future with global warming,
the vulnerability of international water treaties is becoming an important issue. The paper
suggests that, with more frequent and prolonged drought, financial transfers are required (in
addition to a physical allocation of water) to preserve cooperation among countries. It provides
some insights on how to design those transfers to avoid water conflicts as much as possible.
19
A Proof of Proposition 1
The following example shows that the upstream incremental RSA fails to satisfy the core lower bounds for n = 3.
Let us consider a river shared among three countries with identical benefit functions b1(a) = b2(a) = b3(a) =
a(12− a) = b(a) for every a ∈ [1, 10] but unequal controlled water flows e = (e1, e2, e3) = (4, 6, 2). The satiated
consumption levels are xˆi = 6 for a maximal benefit of bi(xˆi) = 36 for i = 1, 2, 3. The optimal water allocation
prescribes to share equally the total flow of water e1 +e2 +e3 = 12 which requires that country 2 supplies country
3 with 2 units of water. It leads to a total welfare v(1, 2, 3, e) = 3b(4) = 96. The coalition {2, 3} can secure a
welfare v(2, 3, e) = 64 by dividing equally e2 + e3 = 8 the same way. The upstream incremental RSA assigns
zu1 = v(1, 2, 3, e) − v(2, 3, e) = 96 − 64 = 32 and zu3 = v(3, e) = b(e3) = 20 to countries 1 and 3 respectively.
On the other hand, both countries can secure a welfare of v(1, 3, e) = 2b(3) = 54 > 52 = zu1 + z
u
3 if country 1
releases one unit of water to supply country 3.
B Proof of Proposition 2
Consider an arbitrary coalition S ⊂ N . If S is connected, the constrained upstream incremental RSA yields to
coalition S a welfare∑
i∈S
zcui = min
{
v(FS, e)− v(F 0S, e) + r(minS − 1),
∑
i∈S
bi(xˆi)
}
. (10)
Since FS = S ∪ F 0S for every S connected, by superadditivity of v, v(FS, e) ≥ v(S, e) + v(F 0S, e). Moreover,
v(S, e) ≤ ∑i∈S bi(xˆi). The last two inequalities combined with (10) and r(j) ≥ 0 for any j ∈ N establish∑
i∈S z
cu
i ≥ v(S, e) for any connected coalition S.
Suppose now that S is not connected. Take the last country in S, which obtains some resource l(S) =
maxi{i ∈ S : xSi > 0}. If l(S) does not exist, then v(S, e) = 0 ≤
∑
i∈S z
cu
i . Let S¯ = Pl(S)\P 0 minS be the
coalition composed by all countries from minS to l(S). Since S¯ is connected then the welfare of S¯ is
∑
i∈S¯
zcui = min
v(FS¯, e)− v(F 0S¯, e) + r(minS¯ − 1),∑
i∈S¯
bi(xˆi)

The last equation with minS¯ = minS and
∑
i∈S¯ z
cu
i =
∑
i∈S z
cu
i +
∑
i∈S¯\S z
cu
i implies,
∑
i∈S
zcui = min
v(FS¯, e)− v(F 0S¯, e) + r(minS − 1),∑
i∈S¯
bi(xˆi)
− ∑
i∈S¯\S
zcui . (11)
Suppose first that v(FS¯, e) − v(F 0S¯, e) + r(minS − 1) ≥ ∑i∈S¯ bi(xˆi). Then ∑i∈S zcui = ∑i∈S¯ bi(xˆi). Since
zcui ≤ bi(xˆi) for every i ∈ S¯\S, (11) implies∑
i∈S
zcui =
∑
i∈S¯
bi(xˆi)−
∑
i∈S¯\S
zcui ≥
∑
i∈S¯
bi(xˆi)−
∑
i∈S¯\S
bi(xˆi) =
∑
i∈S
bi(xˆi) ≥ v(S, e).
Suppose now that v(FS¯, e)− v(F 0S¯, e) + r(minS − 1) <∑i∈S¯ bi(xˆi). Then, since FS¯ = S¯ ∪ F 0S¯, by superad-
ditivity of v, v(FS¯, e) ≥ v(S¯, e) + v(F 0S¯, e) which, combined with (11) and r(minS − 1) ≥ 0, implies∑
i∈S
zcui ≥ v(S¯, e)−
∑
i∈S¯\S
zcui . (12)
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Since countries in-between connected coalitions in S up to l(S) divert xncSi = xˆi for every i ∈ S¯\S, the water
allocation ((xSi )i∈S∩S¯ , (xˆi)i∈S¯\S) can be implemented in S¯ and, therefore, v(S¯, e) ≥ v(S ∩ S¯, e) +
∑
i∈S¯\S bi(xˆi).
Furthermore, since xSi = 0 downstream l(S) in S for every i ∈ S\Pl(S), and, therefore bi(xSi ) = 0 for every
i ∈ S\Pl(S), v(S, e) = v(S ∩ Pl(S), e) = v(S ∩ S¯, e). Thus we have:
v(S¯, e) ≥ v(S, e) +
∑
i∈S¯\S
bi(xˆi). (13)
Since zcui ≤ bi(xˆi) for every i ∈ S¯\S by definition, (12) and (13) imply
∑
i∈S z
cu
i ≥ v(S, e)+
∑
i∈S¯\S (bi(xˆi)− zcui ).
Since by definition zcui ≤ bi(xˆi), it implies
∑
i∈S z
cu
i ≥ v(S, e) the desired conclusion.
C Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose e′1 < e1. By concavity of bi, 0 <  ≤ e′1 implies
b1(e
′
1)− b1(e′1 − ) ≥ b1(e1)− b1(e1 − ). (14)
Assuming  = e1 − x∗1 ≤ e′1 where the last inequality is due to the assumption x′1 = e′1 − e1 + x∗1 ≥ 0, equation
(14) becomes
b1(e
′
1) > b1(e1) + b1(x
′
1)− b1(x∗1).
Substituting td1 = v(1, e) − b1(x∗1) = b1(e1) − b1(x∗1), it leads to the desired conclusion b1(e′1) > b1(x′1) + td1, i.e.
defection by country 1.
D Proof of Theorem
Consider an acceptable RSA (x∗, t) and realized water flows e′ ≤ e where the sign “ ≤ ” means e′j ≤ e′j for every
j ∈ N and e′i < ei for one i ∈ N at least. Suppose first that an acceptable RSA (x∗, t) is sustainable but not
(x∗, tcu) with t 6= td. Then ∃i < n such that the no-defection constraint hold for i with (x∗, t) but not with
(x∗, tcu):
bi(x
′
i) + ti ≥ bi(E′i)−
∑
j∈P0i
tj ,
bi(x
′
i) + t
cu
i < bi(E
′
i)−
∑
j∈P0i
tcuj .
The two inequalities imply:∑
j∈Pi
tj >
∑
j∈Pi
tcuj .
Adding
∑
j∈Pi bj(x
∗
j ) both sides of the last inequality leads to:∑
j∈Pi
(
tj + bj(x
∗
j )
)
>
∑
j∈Pi
(
tcuj + bj(x
∗
j )
)
. (15)
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Since (x∗, t) is a core RSA, it satisfies the core lower bound for coalition F 0i:
∑
j∈F0i
(
tj + bj(x
∗
j )
) ≥ v(F 0i, e).
By the core lower bound for N , we have
∑
j∈Pi
(
tj + bj(x
∗
j )
)
= v(N, e)−
∑
j∈F0i
(
tj + bj(x
∗
j )
)
.
The two last equations imply:
∑
j∈Pi
(
tj + bj(x
∗
j )
) ≤ v(N, e)− v(F 0i, e).
Combined with (15), it leads to
v(N, e)− v(F 0i, e) >
∑
j∈Pi
(
tcuj + bj(x
∗
j )
)
.
Therefore, by definition of (x∗, tcu),
∑
j∈Pi
(
tcuj + bj(x
∗
j )
)
=
∑
j∈Pi
bj(xˆj),
which combined with (15) contradicts that (x∗, t) is fair.
Suppose now that (x∗, td) is sustainable but not another acceptable RSA (x∗, t) t 6= td. Then ∃i < n such
that the no-defection constraint hold for i with (x∗, td) but not with (x∗, t):
bi(x
′
i) + t
d
i ≥ bi(E′i)−
∑
j∈P0i
tdj ,
bi(x
′
i) + ti < bi(E
′
i)−
∑
j∈P0i
tj .
The two inequalities imply:
∑
j∈Pi
tdj >
∑
j∈Pi
tj .
Adding
∑
j∈Pi bj(x
∗
j ) to both sides, it leads to:∑
j∈Pi
(bj(x
∗
j ) + t
d
j ) >
∑
j∈Pi
(bj(x
∗
j ) + tj).
Since
∑
j∈Pi bj(x
∗
j ) + t
d
j ) = v(Pi, e) by definition of t
d, then the last inequality is equivalent to
v(Pi, e) >
∑
j∈Pi
(bj(x
∗
j ) + tj),
Which contradicts that (x∗, t) is a core RSA, since it violates the core lower bound for S = Pi.
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E An illustrative example
We provide an example in which the downstream incremental RSA and the constraint upstream incremental
RSA differ. Consider a river shared by n = 3 countries with identical benefit functions b1(x) = b2(x) = b3(x) =
100x− .5x2 for every x ∈ (10, 120). Suppose that country 1 controls 80 units of water, country 2 controls 60 units
and country 3 controls 40 units. Since the countries have identical benefits from water consumption, efficiency
requires to share equally the 180 units of water, each of them consuming x∗i = 60 units for i = 1, 2, 3. The transfers
are td = (600, 100,−700) for the downstream incremental RSA, and tcu = (800, 200,−1000) for the constrained
upstream incremental RSA. Allocating mean flow efficiently requires that countries 1 and 2 release 20 units of
water each. If the water flow in country 1 is 70 instead of 80, then country 1 consumes 50 units of water instead
of 60 to supply country 2 with 20 units of water. Doing so, it obtains b1(50) + t
d
1 = 3750 + 600 = 4350 under the
downstream incremental RSA and b1(50) + t
u
1 = 3750 + 800 = 4550 under the constrained upstream incremental
RSA. On the other hand, country 1 can achieve b1(70) = 4550 by defecting. Therefore country 1 defects under
downstream incremental RSA (x∗, td) but not under the constrained upstream incremental (x∗, tcu). If country
2 experiences the same reduction of 10 units of water which leads it to consume only 50 units of water, it obtains
b2(50) + t
d
2 = 3750 + 100 = 3850 under (x
∗, td) and b2(50) + tcu2 = 3750 + 200 = 3950 under (x
∗, tcu). Once
country 1 has released 20 units of water, country 2 controls 50+20=70 units. By not releasing water, country
2 enjoys b2(70) − td1 = 4550 − 600 = 3950 under (x∗, td) and b2(80) − tcu1 = 4550 − 900 = 3250 under (x∗, tcu).
Again, country 2 defects under (x∗, td) but not under (x∗, tcu).
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